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8The culture of 
capitalism
Jonathan Rutherford
Jonathan Rutherford looks at contemporary changes 
in the practices and cultures of capitalism. 
W e are living through an age of transition. The new co-exists with the old. We can identify political, economic and cultural elements of this change, but we do not yet have a way of describing the kind of 
society we are living in. The great explanatory frameworks of political economy 
and sociology inherited from the industrial modernity of the nineteenth century 
leave too much unsaid. Theories of the moment tend to skip from one modern 
phenomenon to another. They are like stones skimming across the surface of water. 
We lack a story of these times.
In the last three decades Britain, the US and other anglo-saxon economies 
have been experiencing a new type of capitalism. Class and the social relations 
of production are being re-organised by new regimes of capital accumulation. 
These changes raise a number of questions. How are new technologies and the 
new modes of production and consumption transforming the cultures and social 
relations of class? In what ways are individuals as social beings changing in these 
new conditions? How is capitalism utilising labour as a force of production? 
Contradictions abound across the old and the new, the national and the global. We 
need an analysis of contemporary capitalism, its culture of unrest and its forms of 
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capital accumulation. There are no clear signposts to follow. But, as Rebecca Solnit 
says, getting lost is like the beginning of fi nding your way. 
Britain’s old model of mass industrial production and capital accumulation 
began to fail in the 1970s. Growing pressure from labour for increased wages was 
undermining business profi tability. Trade and overseas markets were limited by 
international competition and the decolonisation process across the third world. 
The growth of industrial capital relied upon a high ratio of profi ts to wages.1 The 
outcome was a collapse in the rate of profi t and a systemic crisis. Infl ation rose 
to double fi gures. Economic growth slowed and the balance of payments defi cit 
increased.
Out of this crisis arose a new and invigorated global capitalism which originated 
in Britain and the US. Three factors underpinned its extraordinary revival. The fi rst 
was the development of new information and communication technologies (ICTs), 
which began to transform traditional manufacturing and distribution systems. 
The utilisation of knowledge and culture as economic resources created new 
types of ‘post-fordist’ fi rms, products and markets. The second was the infl uence 
on economic policy of neo-liberal ideals, which claimed to maximise individual 
freedom through the deregulation of markets. Only competitive capitalism, free 
from the interference of the state, could guarantee the separation of economic 
power from political power and so ensure liberty. Third, there was the emergence 
during the 1960s of new values in the counter-cultures of the young middle 
classes. Under conditions of growing and sustained affl uence in the West, the 
imperatives of economic security gave way to post-materialist values associated with 
identity, ethics and belonging. These created a powerful trend toward a ‘liberation 
ethic’ of individual self-expression, anti-establishment sentiment, emotional 
attunement to the world, and the personal pursuit of pleasure. These cultures, the 
ideological weapon of neo-liberalism, and the new technologies of information and 
communication (including the media), were key resources for creating the new 
regimes of capital accumulation. 
The political response to the crisis of capitalism came with the election 
of Margaret Thatcher in 1979. The Conservative government began with no 
coherent ideology, but neo-liberal ideas soon began to set the agenda for change. A 
hegemonic project - Thatcherism - took shape. Milton Friedman’s ‘shock therapy’ 
was applied to the British economy and working class. The welfare state began 
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to be dismantled. Low profi t, traditional, manufacturing industry was shut down 
and de-industrialisation was allowed to accelerate. Mass unemployment was used 
to drive down labour costs and destroy the infl uence of the trade unions. Capital 
controls were abolished. The aim was to eradicate collectivist cultures and optimise 
the conditions for capital accumulation. A possessive, petty bourgeois individualism 
spoke a civic language of self-reliance and authoritarian populism. In contrast a 
hedonistic culture of consumer choice created markets in aesthetics, personal leisure 
and fashion. Technology fi rst revolutionised the retailing sector and then catalysed 
change across the economy. As the de-industrialising North disintegrated into 
poverty, the big cities and Southern England boomed with new service, fi nancial and 
high tech industries.
The neo-liberal ideology of Thatcherism virulently attacked the progressive 
social infl uences of the civic counter-cultures of the 1960s, while at the same 
time marketising them in consumer culture and in the social relations of the 
new industries. It transformed the political and economic landscape. However 
its attempts to reduce public owned resources as a share of GDP foundered on 
a residual, popular social democracy. In 1997 New Labour achieved power by 
appealing to this social democratic sensibility while accommodating itself to the 
neo-liberal ascendancy. To manage this contradiction it abandoned traditional 
class-based politics for its own brand of aspirational individualism. The ideological 
driving force was the Department of Trade and Industry under its Minister, Peter 
Mandelson. A key fi gure was Charles Leadbeater, who had developed his idea of a 
new individualism a decade earlier in the pages of Marxism Today. The failure of the 
left, he had argued, was its lack of a vision of an individually-based collectivism. 
However, by the 1990s his ‘socialist individualism’ had metamorphised into the 
fi gure of the entrepreneur: ‘confi dent, inspiring, charismatic ... quick to absorb new 
ideas, restless to discover new opportunities’.2 
Two documents have come to defi ne New Labour’s adoption of this politics 
of individualisation. The 1998 Competitiveness White Paper, Our Competitive 
Future - Building the Knowledge Driven Economy, set out a framework for Britain’s 
industrial policy in which the market and its values were central. National prosperity 
depended on the ability to create a knowledge driven economy. Peter Mandelson 
delivered New Labour’s vision: ‘Knowledge and its profi table exploitation by 
business is the key to competitiveness’. This was followed by the 2001 White Paper 
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on Enterprise, Skills and Innovation, which addressed the creation of a labour force 
for the knowledge economy. Individual and business success was dependent upon 
a culture of innovation and competitiveness. Education and training would create 
workers who were autonomous entrepreneurs rather than dependent employees.
A new economy developed rapidly, based in the South East, organised around 
the technological development of the commodity and trading in intangible 
intellectual assets. It was dominated by the global fi nancial sector, whose share 
of GDP increased from 6.6 per cent in 1996 to 9.4 per cent in 2006. Its business 
model became the new paradigm of the capitalist revival and has been incorporated 
into traditional sectors of the economy. Profi t seeking in the traditional way is no 
longer the sole driver of economic activity. What counts is increasing shareholder 
value. As Richard Sennett has argued, companies must constantly ‘re-engineer’ 
- introduce new products, create new markets, restructure their organisations and 
re-brand - to signal to the capital markets their economic dynamism. Profi t alone 
will not guarantee a rising share price. This demand for constant change creates 
organisational cultures characterised by a state of permanent revolution without a 
cause. The pursuit of insecurity is the business model of the new economy. 
It is this business model that New Labour adopted in its policies on the 
knowledge economy and in its modernisation plans for the public sector. Public 
service reform turned the organisational cultures of education, healthcare and 
welfare into quasi- or proxy markets. Intangible outputs such as relationships of 
care, the processes of learning and the provision of social security were incentivised 
and measured by proxies such as cost indicators and league tables, in order to judge 
their ‘value for money’.
A capitalism of intimacy
The fastest growing economic sector during the 1990s was the cultural industries 
- advertising, architecture, TV and radio, music, publishing, fi lm and video, 
design, designer fashion, and computer and video games. Their raw materials 
are information, sounds, words, symbols, images, ideas, produced in creative, 
emotional and intellectual labour. By 2001 the Government’s Creative Industries 
Mapping Document reported that the cultural industries were worth £112.5bn and 
employed 1.3m people. Now estimated to be worth 8 per cent of the economy, they 
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are indicative of the rise in an experience-oriented consumerism whose ends are 
aesthetic pleasure and self-fulfi lment. 
The Future Foundation’s regular survey Changing Lives asked interviewees in 
2004: ‘If you had just one wish, which one of these would you choose? To be more 
highly esteemed; to have less fear; to be able to afford something; to be able to fulfi l 
yourself; to have more friendship.’ The proportion choosing personal fulfi lment as 
their number one wish more than doubled between 1986 and 2004; for those in 
their 60s it increased from 18 per cent to 56 per cent; for those in their 40s the rise 
was from 19 per cent to 48 per cent. In another question the survey asked: ‘For 
each item I read out will you please tell me whether you feel the need for it strongly, 
moderately, slightly, or not at all. Firstly ... To satisfy my need for new experiences.’ 
Eighty per cent of 16-24 year olds felt they must strongly or moderately satisfy their 
need for new experiences, up from 56 per cent in 1983. A similar proportional 
increase was registered in those aged 35 to 54, with the largest increase being 
amongst 45 to 54 year olds: up from 22 per cent to 42 per cent. This cultural 
revolution crosses classes. During this period social group AB registered a fairly 
small increase in those responding positively to this question, from 55 per cent to 
60 per cent; but in other social groups the proportion increased by a much greater 
margin. In the C2 group it rose from 32 per cent to 51 per cent and in the DE group 
from 35 per cent to 49 per cent.3
Individuals increasingly view culture as something to be actively created, rather 
than passed down from on high and passively consumed. The 2006 Offi ce of 
National Statistics survey shows that after housing and transport costs, the highest 
household spending category is recreation and culture. Social networking sites 
like Facebook and MySpace have facilitated new kinds of community for tens of 
millions of individuals. The virtual world Second Life, established in 2003, has over 
5,500,000 avatars and L$2.6bn (Linden dollars) in virtual circulation. Its real world 
exchange rate is L$250 to the US dollar. After social networking and pornography, 
the internet’s largest collective activity is the creation of family histories. Individuals 
are redefi ning a sense of history through their personal genealogies. Technology is 
creating new kinds of commons and at the same time opening up new opportunities 
for capital to commodify these cultural practices. 
The new capitalism is extending commodifi cation into the realms of subjective 
life. Its forms of production are not confi ned to output, but use individuals and their 
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relationships in the co-inventing of cultural and symbolic meanings and new ideas. 
The market creates communities of interests and seeks the intimacy of the consumer 
in order to embed commercial transactions in personal and daily life. Promotional 
culture creates desiring consumers whose personal histories can be mined for their 
interests, desires and purchases. The economic sphere expands as production 
conscripts the thinking, imagination and sensibilities of individuals. New kinds of 
property and property relations are being created by companies using patenting and 
intellectual property law. Just as early industrial capitalism enclosed the commons 
of land and labour, so today’s post-industrial capitalism is enclosing the cultural and 
intellectual commons (both real and virtual), the commons of the human mind and 
body, and the commons of biological life.
Paulo Virno argues that the productive force of post-fordist economic activity 
is ‘the life of the mind’.4 Not just cognition, but also intuition and the symbolic 
world of the unconscious, where communication is non-verbal. In order to utilise 
this potential, capital is creating communicative forms of labour. These forms 
do not make tangible products but function as transmitters of care, information, 
symbolic meaning and learning (in effect, they lubricate the means of production). 
Education plays a central role in producing these new kinds of production. The 
organisational cultures of schools, colleges and universities have been subjected to 
continuous corporate reform as they are geared to the labour market and economy. 
Their function is to realise individual productive potential and to facilitate the 
restructuring of the class relations of production. Because communicative labour has 
no end product, what counts as a measure of productivity is performance. In school 
and at work, a culture of capitalism rewards individuals who comply with market-
shaped criteria to measure, judge and discipline themselves in pursuit of a self-
reliant, entrepreneurial form of life. This culture of capitalism is about producing 
the subjectivity of the individual as a form of economic potential. Failure, closely 
linked to class, brings with it the threat of exclusion from its promise of a good life. 
But success on its treadmill of competitive exams, performance demanding careers, 
and never-be-still life trajectories, can lead to a sense of inauthenticity and futility. 
The culture of capitalism is nihilistic. It invades what the psychoanalyst Donald 
Winnicott calls the space of creative living, which is ‘sacred to the individual’. Here, 
in the name of profi t, or utility or function, it requisitions the tools of social life 
- intellect, learning, relational life, communication. 
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Class and consumption
The promises of economic success and the pleasures of consumption cast a veil 
over the inequalities generated by these new modes of capital accumulation. A 
majority of the UK population is peripheral to wealth creation and its productive 
forces. One in six leaves school unable to read, write or add up properly. Social 
mobility has diminished. The fastest growing occupations are not in creative and 
knowledge work, but in low paid communicative labour: data input, admin, face-
to-face services in health, education and care. Half the population share just 6 per 
cent of UK wealth, owning assets of £600 or less. In stark contrast to this low wage, 
low skill workforce is the new, high net worth market of very rich individuals. The 
Institute of Fiscal Studies has identifi ed the top 1 per cent of individuals - 470,000 
people - who earn an average annual income of £220,000 and between them 
own approximately 25 per cent of marketable wealth. Within this group wealth is 
unevenly distributed, with the top 0.1 per cent earning an average of £780,000.5 
The traditional working class in the UK, formed out of the industrial revolution, 
has lost its economic role as the engine of wealth creation. Manufacturing as a share 
of GDP fell to 13.2 per cent in 2006. With the introduction of new technologies, its 
workforce continues to decline. Goods are increasingly imported from a periphery 
of poor, low-wage economies where primitive forms of capital accumulation, backed 
up by WTO rules and bilateral trade agreements, are creating a global proletariat 
in conditions of violence and exploitation. The working class, forced to compete 
with this global proletariat in a fl exible labour market, is being caught in a vortex of 
Victorian-era casualised labour. Migrant labour is used by unscrupulous employers 
to further deregulate the labour market and drive down wages. The institution of 
work, once a source of collective cultural identity, has become fragmented, making 
forms of class solidarity diffi cult to organise. Class consciousness is displaced by 
the fear of redundancy, not simply from employment but from life’s purpose. This 
threat to the integrity of the self generates anxieties over individual status and loss of 
recognition as a social being. The culture of capitalism has depoliticised class while 
heightening the inequalities and social gulf between classes.
In the society of consumers, class develops a new lexicon of cultural domination. 
Individualised status-seeking consumption enacts the old class confl icts and 
inequalities. Consumption offers the pleasurable pursuit of desire, but it is also a 
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mass symbolic struggle for individual social recognition, which distributes shame 
and humiliation to those lower down the hierarchy. The pain of failure, of being 
a loser, of being invisible to those above, cuts a deep wound in the psyche. This 
kind of stress dramatically increases our vulnerability to disease and premature 
death. Violence is more common where there is more inequality because people 
are deprived of the markers of status and so are more vulnerable to the anxieties of 
being judged by others. This is the culture of consumption that has driven growth 
in the UK economy. It has been primed by the hard selling of cheap credit, which 
makes accessible a never-ending value chain of positional goods. The resulting 
personal debt has created an indentured consumption that requires never-ending 
work in a precarious labour market. Total UK debt stands at £1.4 trillion, of which 
£223bn is unsecured debt. In terms of profi tability what counts is not the selling 
of commodities, but the lending to buy them. The highly lucrative markets in debt 
have fuelled the City bonuses of the super-rich. In 2007 they totalled £14bn. In 
effect capital lays claim to future earnings as a means of accumulation. 
The extension of the commodity form into non-market areas of life has 
privatised the public realm and opened up intimate, personal life to the market. It 
has eroded civility, and the boundary between social relations and economic utility. 
It threatens the social bonds of care, association and community. Isolation and 
alienation contribute to a social recession: a near epidemic of stress, eating disorders, 
alcoholism, mental illness, men’s violence against women. The culture of capitalism, 
with its boundless choices and omniscient dreams of celebrity fame, disassembles 
human wanting and need. What is claimed to be freedom veers toward a tyranny 
of objectless desire, an opaque and unbounded world that leads to all kinds of 
compulsive and addictive behaviours. Personal boundaries are more easily pierced 
by nameless fears. Young women, subjected to an unremitting commercial sexual 
gaze, are incited into anxious states of self-dislike and body-management. What is 
inside and what is outside is no longer clear. It has become commonplace to feel one 
lives, so to speak, as a stranger outside the community.
Cultural difference is the prism through which large sections of the white 
population experience and react to their insecurity. Migrants whose cheap labour 
is exploited to bring down wage levels are viewed as competition for housing 
and under-resourced public services. They become the portents of social disaster 
and cultural loss. Political antagonisms and culture wars around race, gender and 
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religion attempt to construct boundaries of identity which will defi ne a sense of 
belonging and entitlement. At stake in the transition from an investment in an 
imagined mono-culture to a capacity to live with multi-culture is the struggle for 
individual and cultural recognition. As Sue Gerhardt argues, ‘we are dependent 
on what others see, and how much of our “being” they recognise’. Class inequality 
creates a paucity of recognition, and cultural difference becomes a focus for people’s 
fear, paranoia and hatred. 
The uncertainty, the constant change and the decline in a sense of belonging 
herald the spectre of the cultural destruction of the traditional working class. Life 
continues but the cultural symbols that gave it meaning have been destroyed. Those 
who fl ourished in the old class culture fi nd themselves ill equipped to deal with 
the new. For them the future becomes diffi cult to imagine. The question of hope 
is bound to the question of how to live. To lose a way of life is to lose a sense of 
hopefulness. 
A new politics
We live in a time not of capitalism without class, but of capitalism destroying and 
creating class cultures and social relations around its new modes of production. 
Technologies continue to transform industries. Large sections of the population 
live and work as if they are a reserve army of labour: economically inactive, or 
working in casualised and temporary jobs, or threatened with the loss of their job. 
Class inequalities in health and education are becoming entrenched. The process 
of individualisation, evident for much of modernity, has been accelerated by the 
market and the imposition of entrepreneurial ways of life. Employees, students, 
schoolchildren, welfare benefi t recipients are made responsible for their own social 
capital investment decisions, risk management and life course. With the decline 
in welfare provision, work, however insecure and poorly paid, is deifi ed by the 
government as the panacea of all social and individual ills. The culture of capitalism 
demands competitive self-enhancement and performativity, and with these come 
the threats of a precarious life, personal failure and existential redundancy. This 
culture of nihilism erodes the trust and reciprocity which underpinned the 
interdependencies of individuals. Non-market modes of life are squeezed between 
the intensifying demands for target driven productivity and commercial value, and 
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the fear of being excluded or made useless and invisible. 
After three decades, there is no end in sight to this period of transition. Despite 
the vigour of capitalist growth, the structural problems of the 1970s associated with 
the falling rate of profi t have not been resolved. Rising oil prices associated with 
peak oil and growing international competition from China and India threaten the 
longer term hegemony of Western capital. The collapse of the US sub-prime market 
has revealed the inherent dangers of under-regulated fi nancialised capitalism. An 
argument can now be made that the era of possessive individualism is on the ebb. 
Popular response amongst the middle classes to the experience of individualisation 
is changing. The benefi ts of economic growth and the pleasures of consumerism are 
increasingly marred by anxieties over debt and now the prospect of falling house 
prices. The growing levels of mental illness are not confi ned to people living in 
poverty. Middle-class children are at risk of self-harm, eating disorders, depression 
and burn-out. The fear of impoverishment in old age, and the burdens of caring for 
aged relatives, extend across the population. Compounding these is the threat of 
global warming. For the great majority of people, there are no individual, market 
solutions to these problems. 
New forms of political activity have grown up outside the institutions and 
structures of the old order. They have created a multitude of skirmishes that defy 
the old political categories. An extraordinary array of social movements, single issue 
campaigns and community actions refl ect a growing level of political activity that is 
often global in its dimension. These social and cultural politics are also manifest in 
individual and group pre-occupations with race, identity and belonging. There is a 
‘bio-politics’ of the body, emotions, sexuality, nature. ‘Life’, argues Virno, ‘lies at the 
centre of politics when the prize to be won is immaterial labour power.’ Democratic 
personal relationships, an ethics of authenticity, and ecological concern inform 
alternative ways of living that seek to counter the invasive force of the market and 
commodifi cation. These micro-politics are without common voice or organisation, 
but they articulate the contradictions and confl icts of the emerging social and class 
relations of contemporary capitalism. 
The change from a society of producers to a society of consumers requires 
a new kind of politics. The old politics and language of collectivism has lost its 
applicability. Central to any new politics of the left will be the revival of forms of 
political struggle around class and inequality. It will need to develop an idea of 
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the common - a livable balance between togetherness and individual autonomy. 
Individuals are not the discrete and closed personalities of capitalist markets. We 
bring into the world our own propensities, but our minds and individuality are 
properties of the cultures, values, conscious and unconscious communications 
we grow up within. They form the fabric of our social bonds and relations. The 
culture of capitalism does violence to this fabric because it destroys the relational 
nature of individuality. A new politics will be socialist because it will recognise the 
interdependence of individuals. Tend to the social and the individual will fl ourish. 
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